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NOTES 
Black English and Equal Educational Opportunity 
Section l 703(f) of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 
19741 orders educational agencies not to "deny equal educational 
opportunity . . . on account of race, color, sex, or national origin" 
by failing "to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers 
that impede [students'] equal participation in ... instructional pro-
grams."2 In Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. 
Ann Arbor School .District Board,3 a group of black children alleged 
that a school board had violated section l 703(f) by failing to take 
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (1976 and Supp. II 1978). 
2. No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his 
or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by . . . 
(f) the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language 
barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional programs. 
20 u.s.c. § 1703(f) (1976). 
3. 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979). The suit was originally brought in 1977 by 15 
(later 11) black schoolchildren and their parents, all residing in the Green Road Housing Pro-
ject in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Green Road is a "scatter" housing project, designed to help 
economically and socially integrate the predominantly white, middle-class neighborhood in 
which it is located. This neighborhood, including the Green Road Project, is served by the 
Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School. The original suit alleged that King School, in 
the process of determining children's eligibility for special education programs, "failed to de-
termine whether the children's learning difficulties stem[med] from cultural, social, and eco-
nomic deprivation and to establish a program which would enable the children to overcome 
the cultural, social, and economic deprivations which allegedly prevent[ed] then [sic), in vary-
ing degrees, from making normal progress in school." Martin Luther King Junior Elementary 
School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 1324, 1326 (E.D. Mich. 1978). This 
failure, according to the plaintiffs, violated their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, 
their right to equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment, their right to be 
free from discrimination in programs receiving federal funds protected by title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), and their right to equal educational opportunity 
protected by the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1976). 451 
F. Supp. at 1326. 
Because the plaintiffs cast their complaint in terms of social and economic rather than 
racial discrimination, and because there is no fundamental right to education under the 
Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1972), the King court dismissed the claims under the fourteenth amendment, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1983 and 1985, and title VI. 451 F. Supp. at 1327-28, 1333. The court refused to dismiss the 
plaintiffs' cause of action under section 1703(f), however, holding that the section was not 
limited to foreign-language barriers, but rather that it encompassed any "language barriers of 
appropriate severity," including those caused by black English. 451 F. Supp. at 1332. In a 
second opinion, Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Michigan Bd. of 
Educ., 463 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. Mich. 1978), the court ordered the plaintiffs to refine their 
pleadings under section 1703(f) to allege (1) that a language barrier existed at King School; (2) 
that this language barrier impeded the plaintiffs' equal participation in King School's instruc-
tional programs; (3) that the Ann Arbor School District had failed to take appropriate action 
to overcome this language barrier; and (4) that the District's failure was on account of race. 
463 F. Supp. at at 1030-31. The court also held that section 1703(f)'s "on account of race" 
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appropriate action to overcome a language barrier arising from the 
children's black English dialect.4 Judge Charles Joiner agreed with 
the plaintiff children, holding that the teachers' response to the chil-
dren's dialect created a section 1703(f) language barrier, and that the 
barrier impeded the children's reading progress, thereby interfering 
with their equal participation in their school's instructional pro-
gram.5 The court ordered the school board to submit a plan to pro-
vide its teachers with readily available information about black 
English, and to help them to use that knowledge in teaching the 
plaintiffs to read standard English. 6 
There is a danger that the King case will be misunderstood. The 
press has sometimes portrayed it as a vindication of the right to use 
black English in the classroom rather than of the educational oppor-
tunities of the children who speak it, and the King opinion itself is at 
times confusing. This Note clarifies the meaning of King and section 
1703(f) by examining four critical steps in Judge Joiner's reasoning. 
Section I examines the court's holding that "language barriers" 
under section l 703(f) include impediments to equal educational op-
portunity arising from dialect differences, and concludes that al-
though the court's argument is incomplete, the legislative history of 
section 1703(f) and overall purpose of the Equal Educational Oppor-
tunities Act support the King result. Section II explores the limita-
tions of the court's factual finding that a section l 703(f) language 
barrier existed at King School. Section III analyzes the court's deter-
mination that the Ann Arbor School District Board failed to take 
appropriate action to overcome the language barrier at King School, 
language did not require the plaintiffs to prove racially discriminatory purpose, only racially 
discriminatory effect. 463 F. Supp. at 1031-32; see notes 65-91 infra and accompanying text. 
The court's third opinion, Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Ann 
Arbor School Dist. Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979), followed the trial. All three 
opinions form the basis for the discussion in this Note. 
4. Black English is a social dialect of English, see J. FALK, LINGUISTICS AND LANGUAGE 
287 (1978), the history and structure of which have been studied and desc9bed in detail. See 
generally R. BURLING, ENGLISH IN BLACK AND WHITE (1973); J. DILLARD, BLACK ENGLISH 
(1972); G. SMITHERMAN, TALKIN AND TESTIFYIN (1977); W. WOLFRAM, A SOCIOLINGUISTIC 
DESCRIPTION OF DETROIT NEGRO SPEECH (1969); Labov, The Logic of Nonstandard English, 
in LANGUAGE AND POVERTY (F. Williams ed. 1970); Stewart, Toward a History of American 
Negro lJialect, in LANGUAGE AND POVERTY (F. Williams ed. 1970). Social dialects arise from 
socioeconomic and cultural isolation of sub-groups of speakers. See J. FALK, supra, at 287, 
293, 303. The dialects spoken by dominant socioeconomic groups are generally viewed as 
"standard" dialects and are considered prestigious, while dialects spoken by lower socioeco-
nomic classes, like black English, are typically stigmatized. See B. ARTHUR, TEACHING ENG-
LISH TO SPEAKERS OF ENGLISH 84-86 (1973); R. BURLING, supra, at 19-27. 
Researchers have suggested numerous problems black-English-speaking children might 
face when learning to read or speak standard English. See text at notes 29-39 infra. 
5. 473 F. Supp. at 1382. 
6. See 473 F. Supp. at 1383. 
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and assesses the court's interpretation of section 1703(f)'s "appropri-
ate action" requirement. Finally, Section IV musters support for the 
court's holding that section 1703(f) does not require plaintiffs to 
show that a school district's failure to take appropriate- action had a 
racially discriminatory purpose. The Note concludes that section 
1703([) properly applies to claims such as the one in the King case, 
and that the court's opinion furthers the purpose of the Equal Edu-
cational Opportunities Act while imposing only a modest duty on 
school districts. 
I. LANGUAGE BARRIERS UNDER SECTION 1703(f) 
To uphold the children's claim in King, Judge Joiner first had to 
justify a broad and novel interpretation of the words "language bar-
rier" in section 1703(f). Prior to the King case, courts had applied 
section l 703(f) only to cases involving language barriers encoun-
tered by non-English-speaking children.7 The Ann Arbor children, 
however, did not claim that they spoke a foreign language or even 
that teachers and students at King School had difficulty understand-
ing each other. The barrier alleged in King was not a lack of com-
prehension, but rather a tendency of teachers to treat black English 
dialect, and the children who spoke it, as inferior. Embracing the 
children's claim, the King court held that the scope of 1703(f) was 
not limited to comprehension barriers arising from foreign language 
differences, and that Congress intended the statute to apply to any 
impediments caused by language differences, including dialect dif-
ferences, if such impediments are severe enough to interfere with 
students' equal participation in a school's instructional program.8 
Accordingly, the court held that section 1703(f) applies to language 
barriers of "appropriate severity" encountered by black-English-
speaking students.9 
To support this conclusion the court relied on the language of 
section l 703(f) and a 1972 Presidential message to Congress. Sec-
tion 1703 provides: 
No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on 
account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by . . . 
1. See, e.g., Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, 587 
F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978); Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
1034 (1975); Deerfield Hutterian Assn. v. Ipswich Bd. of Educ., 444 F. Supp. 159 (D.S.D. 
1978); Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
8. Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Ann Arbor School Dist. Bd., 
473 F. Supp. 1371, 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School 
Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 1324, 1332 (E.D. Mich. 1978). 
9. Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 451 
F. Supp. 1324, 1332 (E.D. Mich. 1978). 
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(f) the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action 
to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its 
students in its instructional programs. 10 
The court observed that this wording "places no limitation on the 
character or source of the language barrier." 11 The court then cited 
President Nixon's message to Congress proposing the Equal Educa-
tional Opportunities Act, 12 in which the President explained the Ad-
ministration's view of the duty of educational agencies under section 
1703([): 
[S]chool authorities must take appropriate action to overcome 
whatever language barriers might exist, in order to enable all students 
to participate equally in educational programs. This would establish, 
in effect, an educational bill of rights for Mexican-Americans, Puerto 
Ricans, Indians and others who start under language handicaps, and 
ensure at last that they too would have equal opportunity. 13 
Because President Nixon's message refers to "whatever language 
barriers" might exist, 14 and because it indicates that the statute 
would apply to "others who start under language handicaps," 15 the 
court concluded that the President's listing of Mexican-Americans, 
Puerto Ricans, and Indians was merely illustrative, and that the Ad-
ministration intended the statute to apply not only to non-English-
speaking children, but also to others "whose 'language barrier' re-
su1ts from the use of some type of non-standard English."16 
This critical portion of the court's opinion is cursory, and Presi-
dent Nixon's message is equally susceptible to a more limited inter-
pretation.17 Nevertheless, further examination of the legislative 
10. 20 u.s.c. § 1703(f) (1976). 
11. 451 F. Supp. at 1322. 
12. President Nixon sent his message to Congress on March 17, 1972. See 118 CONG, REC, 
8928-34 (1972). There were extensive House and Senate Hearings on the bill later that month. 
See Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1972: Hearings on S. 3395 Before the Subcomm. on 
Education of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Equal Educational Opportunities Act, Part I: Hearings on 
R.R. 13915 Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess (1972) [here-
inafter cited as House Hearings]. The bill was not enacted by Congress until 1974. See (1974] 
U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 4093. In response to fears that the bill's provisions seeking to 
limit use of busing remedies were unconstitutionai the Conference Committee amended the 
bill before its passage in 1974 to include language from the Senate version of the bill indicating 
the policy of Congress not to interfere with federal courts' power to enforce the guarantees of 
the fourteenth amendment. See 20 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (1976); [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 4219. Section 1703(f), however, was enacted in 1974 exactly as proposed by President 
Nixon in 1972. 
13. 118 CONG. REc. 8931 (1972). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. 451 F. Supp. at 1332. 
17. For example, under the principle of ejusdem generis, President Nixon's list of groups 
affected by language barriers would indicate that section 1703(f) should apply only to those 
students encountering language barriers like those borne by Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ri-
cans, or Indians - in other words, barriers caused by foreign-language differences. 
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history and the overall purpose of the Equal Educational Opportuni-
ties Act indicates that section 1703(f) should apply to language barri-
ers encountered by children who speak black English. 
The most enlightening discussions of section l 703(f)'s purpose 
took place during HEW Secretary Eliot Richardson's testimony 
before Senate and House Committees during hearings on the Equal 
Educational Opportunities Act. 18 Secretary Richardson's testimony 
reveals that, in the Administration's view, while the "central focus" 
of section 1703(f) was to provide non-English-speaking children 
with an affirmative right to a bilingual education, 19 the statute was 
not limited to this purpose. Responding to an inquiry into the differ-
ence between section l 703(f)'s requirements and the existing bilin-
gual education program,20 Secretary Richardson stated that "where 
as [sic] the bilingual education program provides funds to school sys-
tems to develop and support bilingual education, this language in 
effect protects the legal right of any child who has a language handi-
cap to achieve the full benefits of a public education."21 This lan-
guage indicates that section 1703(f) was intended to assist not only 
non-English-speaking children, but also any other children whose 
language limits their full access to educational programs. 
The overall purpose of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act 
also suggests that section l 703(f) should apply to language barriers 
encountered by black-English-speaking children. The Act was 
designed to shift the emphasis in the drive for equality of educa-
tional opportunity from busing to improvement of neighborhood 
schools.22 To achieve this, the Act seeks to limit the use of busing 
18. See Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 68-69 (testimony of Secretary Richardson); 
House Hearings, supra note 12, at 27-28 (testimony of Secretary Richardson). 
19. See House Hearings, supra note 12, at 28. 
20. See Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 68. Senator Dominick, who made this inquiry, 
was apparently referring to programs funded by the Bilingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 880b 
(1976). In 1970, the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare issued the so-called National Origins Memorandum, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970), requiring 
school districts receiving federal funds to take affirmative steps to overcome language deficien-
cies that exclude national-origin minority children from effective participation in schools' in-
structional programs. The National Origins Memorandum did not explicitly require schools 
to adopt bilingual education programs, only to take "affirmative action." See 35 Fed. Reg. 
11,595 (1970). The programs adopted by schools and funded by the Bilingual Education Act 
were thus largely voluntary at the time of the Senate Hearings on the Equal Educational Op-
portunities Act. 
21. Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 68 (emphasis added). 
22. See 118 CONG. REC. 8929 (1972) (message from President Nixon) ("Specifically, I pro-
pose that the Congress enact two measures [the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1972 
and the Student Transportation Moratorium Act of 1972] which together would shift the focus 
from more transportation to better education, and would curb busing while expanding educa-
tional opportunity."); 118 CONG REC. 28,846 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Hicks) ("We must tum 
our efforts away from massive busing schemes and toward developing better programs in the 
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remedies to achieve racial integration while requiring local educa-
tional agencies to improve educational programs and make them 
more accessible to all students.23 These requirements are set out in 
section 1703.24 Most of section 1703's subsections, however, simply 
forbid school districts from intentionally segregating their schools,25 
a duty school districts already have under the fourteenth amend-
ment.26 Only section 1703(f) imposes an affirmative duty on school 
authorities to improve students' access to educational programs.27 
Because Congress was fully aware that blacks constituted a major 
group suffering from inequality of educational opportunity,28 and 
because the Act was designed to off er alternatives to busing, it seems 
schools .... "); I 18 CONG. REC. 28,875 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Dingell) ("The thrust ofH.R. 
13915 [The Equal Educational Opportunities Act] is affirmative. It would correct discrimina-
tions practiced in the past, give full educational opportunity to all, eliminate counterproductive 
and divisive methods tried by the courts out of frustration, [and] use effective methods which 
assist the efforts to adequately and equally educate all our young people .... "). 
23. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1705, 1712-1718 (1976). The purpose of the Act is to "specify ap-
propriate remedies for the orderly removal of the vestiges of the dual school system." 20 
U.S.C. § 170J(b) (1976). In the first King opinion, Martin Luther King Junior Elementary 
School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 1324, 1331-32 (E.D. Mich. 1978), the 
court rejected the argument that this language limited the Act's coverage to school districts 
that had previously operated dual school systems. Instead, the court held that because the 
other subsection of section 1701 consists of a broad policy declaration by Congress in support 
of equal educational opportunity for all children, the Act did not simply restate existing case 
Jaw but actually added new duties and new protection. The court interpreted the "dual school 
systems" language in section 1701 to refer to any school system in violation of the proscrip-
tions in section 1703, holding that the standards of section 1703 constituted a new definition of 
dual school systems that went beyond those that previously employed by courts. 451 F. Supp. 
1330-32. Indeed the Act's prefatory language specifies remedies for removal of the vestiges of 
the dual school system. Congress therefore must have been referring to the overall system of 
education in the United States. The "vestiges" of the dual school systems that once existed in 
many parts of the United States still remain, and are present in communities that have never 
operated dual systems. These "vestiges" exist in the form of present social and economic in-
equalities perpetuated by those dual systems over the years. 
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a)-(f) (1976). 
25. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a), (b) & (d) (1976). 
26. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1976). See note 2 supra. When originally proposed, the Equal 
Educational Opportunities Act also contained a section designed to concentrate compensatory-
education funding on poor schools. See 118 CONG. REC. 8931 (1972) (message from President 
Nixon); 118 CONG. REC. 28,836-37 (1972). This section, however, imposed no new duty on 
school districts to improve students' access to equal participation in educational programs. 
Furthermore, the funds proposed had already been appropriated, see 118 CONG. REC. 28,842 
(1972) (remarks of Rep. Hawkins), so the bill would not have provided any additional com-
pensatory education programs. Finally, this funds-concentration provision was no longer part 
of the Act when it was finally passed in 1974. See (1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 577-
86, 4219-23. Consequently, section l703(f) is the only provision of the Act imposing a new 
affirmative duty on school districts to improve their educational programs. 
28. Much of the floor discussion of the Act centered on the problems faced by blacks. See, 
e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 28,876 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Dingell) ("I believe we have a special 
duty to make sure we do not deny opportunity and useful citizenship to our black citizens."); 
118 CONG. REC. 28,865 (remarks of Rep. Annunzio). 
December 1980] Note - Black English 285 
reasonable to apply tJ:ie Act's only compensatory provision, section 
1703(f), to language barriers disadvantaging blacks. 
The legislative history therefore supports the King court's inter-
pretation of section l 703(f). As the court found, the language of sec-
tion l 703(f) does not limit the character or source of the language 
barrier. Both President Nixon's message and HEW Secretary Rich-
ardson's testimony suggest that while the central purpose of section 
1703(f) is to provide non-English-speaking children with a right to a 
bilingual education, the statute also extends to any language handi-
cap that limits children's access to the full benefits of public educa-
tion. Moreover, the purpose of the statute - to replace busing with 
other compensatory schemes designed to ensure equal educational 
opportunity - suggests an interpretation of section l 703(f) that 
reaches language barriers encountered by black-English-speaking 
children. 
II. FACTUAL FINDINGS: ''TREATING BLACK ENGLISH AS 
INFERIOR" BY FAILING To "TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT" 
Having properly decided that section l 703(f) applies to any lan-
guage barrier that impedes equal participation by students in in-
structional programs, the court proceeded to consider whether the 
plaintiffs encountered such a language barrier at King School. Judge 
Joiner first evaluated the research evidence and expert testimony 
presented by the plaintiffs. 29 According to the court, this evidence 
established, as a matter of fact,30 that teachers may impede the read-
ing development of children who speak black English if they fail to 
understand first, that black English is a systematic dialect, acceptable 
in the home and peer communities of the children who speak it, and 
second, that the differences between black English and standard 
English may cause superficial diffi.culties31 for children who speak 
29. The court heard testimony from nine researchers and professionals, Martin Luther 
King Junior Elementary School Children v. Ann Arbor School Dist. Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371, 
1375 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1979), and received into the record ten different studies, some describing 
the structure of black English, 473 F. Supp. at 1376 n.4, and others supporting, according to 
the court, the theory that teachers' behavior toward black English could impede students' 
learning progress, 473 F. Supp. at 1377 n.5. 
30. 473 F. Supp. at 1375 ("the research results and the opinions of the researchers and 
professionals are better received as evidence in the case, on the record and subject to cross-
examination, than simply by reading the reports and giving consideration to what appears in 
those reports as was done in Brown v. Board ef Education, 347 U.S. 483 ... (1954)"). For a 
discussion of the significance of this treatment, see note 46 i,!fra. 
Judge Joiner may have chosen to treat the matter as a finding of fact rather than law 
because the defendant school board presented no expert witnesses or research evidence of its 
own. See text at note 54 i,!fra. 
31. By "superficial difficulties" the court was apparently referring to expert testimony that 
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black English when they are learning to read and speak standard 
English. 32 The research evidence further indicated that teachers who 
fail to recognize that black English is a systematic dialect33 may con-
clude that children who speak it are not using systematic language, 
but rather speech that is "limited" or "inferior."34 This misappre-
hension may lead such teachers to conclude that their black-English-
speaking students are "dumb," "inferior," lack "concepts," or are 
simply incapable of using systematic language. 35 These teachers may 
then communicate this unwarranted conclusion to their students 
when "correcting" their speech or oral reading. A perception that 
his teacher considers him to be inferior and his language (and there-
fore the language of his family and friends) to be defective may 
cause a child to refrain from future attempts to read aloud or even to 
communicate with his teacher at all.36 A child who is taught that his 
home language system is "wrong," the court states, "loses a sense of 
"because 'black English' does not discriminate among some sounds that are distinguished in 
standard English, teachers experience difficulty in getting students to use correct pronouncia-
tion." 473 F. Supp. at 1376. 
32. 473 F. Supp. at 1376-77, 1382. 
33. The court found, on the basis of the research evidence, that black English is a "distinct, 
definable version of English,'' with "definite language patterns, syntax, grammar and history." 
473 F. Supp. at 1378. See note 4 supra. 
34. 473 F. Supp. at 1377. A number of researchers cited by the court suggest this conclu-
sion. See, e.g., R. BURLING, supra note 4, at 92-93, 105 (1973); J. DILLARD, supra note 4, at 
272 (1973); Abrahams & Gay, Talking Black in the Classroom, in LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 200-01 (R. Abrahams & R. Troike eds. 1972); Labov, 
Some Sources of Reading Problems for Negro Speakers of Nonstandard English, in id. at 276; 
Shuy, Teacher Training and Urban Language Problems, in TEACHING STANDARD ENGLISH IN 
THE INNER CITY 121-25 (R. Fasold & R. Shuy eds. 1970). 
35. 473 F. Supp. at 1377. See R. BURLING, supra note 4, at 102-05; J. DILLARD, supra note 
4, at 273; G. SMITHERMAN, supra note 4, at 217 (1977); Labov, supra note 4, at 187 ("Teachers 
are now being told [by some misinformed educational psychologists] to ignore the language of 
Negro children as unworthy of attention and useless for learning. They are being taught to 
hear every natural utterance of the child as evidence of his mental inferiority."). 
36. 473 F. Supp. at 1377. One researcher reported the following exchange, which occurred 
in an elementary school classroom: 
Student (excitedly): Miz Jones, you remember that show you tole us bout? Well, me and 
my momma 'nem -
Teacher (interrupting with a "warm" smile): Bernadette, start again, I'm sorry, but I can't 
understand you. 
Student (confused): Well, it was that show, me and my momma -
Teacher (interrupting again, still with that "warm" smile): Sorry, I still can't understand 
you. 
(Student, now silent, even more confused than ever, looks at floor, says nothing.) 
Teacher: Now, Bernadette, first of all, it's Mrs. Jones, not Miz Jones. And you know it 
was an exhibit, not a show. Now, haven't I explained to the class over and over again 
that you always put yourself last when you are talking about a group of people and 
yourself doing something? So, therefore, you should say what? 
Student: My momma and me -
Teacher (exasperated): No! My mother and I. Now start again, this time right. 
Student: Aw, that's okay, it wasn't nothin. 
G. SMITHERMAN, supra note 4, at 217-18. See also R. BURLING, supra note 4, at 97. 
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values related to mother and close friends and siblings and may re-
bel at efforts by his teachers to teach reading. . . ."37 The court sum-
marized these research :findings as follows: "[t]he instruction in 
standard English of children who use 'black English' at home by in-
sensitive teachers who treat the children's language system as infer-
ior can cause a barrier to learning to read and use standard 
English."38 
After deriving this general "treatment as inferior" test, the court 
turned to the King School teachers' testimony to determine whether 
they had in fact treated the plaintiffs' black English dialect as infer-
ior, thereby creating a language barrier, and, if so, whether the lan-
guage barrier had interfered with the plaintiffs' equal participation 
in King School's instructional program.39 Although the court found 
"no direct evidence that any of the teachers . . . treated the home 
language of the children as inferior,"40 it nevertheless inferred from 
the teachers' testimony that they had done so.41 Specifically, the 
court determined that the teachers at King School had failed to "take 
into account" the plaintiffs' black English dialect when helping them 
learn to read.42 Unfortunately, the court never explicitly explained 
what failing to "take black English into account" means, or how this 
failure indicated that black English was treated as inferior. The 
opinion does, however, suggest that the court meant to define failure 
to take black English "into account" as both (1) a failure to under-
stand that black English is a systematic dialect acceptable in the stu-
dent's home and peer community, a dialect which may cause 
37. 473 F. Supp. at 1377. Professor Burling suggests that 
If by school policy or even by the unconscious attitudes of his teachers his dialect is dis-
missed as wrong, [a student] is offered a grim choice. Ifhe accepts the school's authority, 
he will come to see the language of his parents, his family, and his friends as evidence of 
their stupidity or laziness. On the other hand, if he refuses to reject his family, it will be 
difficult for him not to reject his school. Our educational system has persuaded many 
children to reject their own heritage and to adapt their language to the demands of soci-
ety, but it is difficult to exaggerate the personal and psychological cost of this adaptation. 
Far more children have fallen by the wayside, rejecting, and rejected by, a rigid social 
system to which they could not conform. 
R. BURLING, supra note 4, at 131. See also B. ARTHUR, supra note 4, at 86-89. 
38. 473 F. Supp. at 1378. 
39. 473 F. Supp. at 1379. 
40. 473 F. Supp. at 1379. 
41. 473 F. Supp. at 1379. According to the court, the teachers' testimony established that 
(1) "although some of the teachers rebel[led] at calling the [students'] home language 'black 
English' they (were] acutely aware ofit"; (2) the teachers refused to admit taking black English 
"into account" when teaching the plaintiffs to read standard English; and (3) the teachers 
"treated the plaintiff students just as they treated other students." 473 F. Supp. at 1379. See 
note 43 i'!fra. 
42. 473 F. Supp. at 1382. 
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students who speak it superficial difficulties in speaking standard 
English, and (2) a failure to use this knowledge about black English 
when teaching children to read standard English.43 
This definition is consistent with the court's findings from the re-
search evidence, because it construes "failing to take black English 
into account" to mean "treating it as inferior." Teachers who fail to 
recognize black English as a systematic dialect are likely to see it as a 
series of random mistakes or errors made by children with an imper-
fect or still-undeveloped ability to use systematic language.44 This 
misinformed view may lead to the misperception of children's ability 
and the insensitive correction patterns against which the research ev-
idence and expert witnesses had warned.45 The teachers' testimony 
therefore allowed the court to inf er that they fell within the general 
"treatment as inferior" test, and that they had created a language 
barrier at King School.46 
The further question under section 1703(f) was whether this Ian-
43. This interpretation of the court's "taking into account" language springs from two 
sources. First, the court states that it is unlikely teachers will be able successfully to overcome 
the language barrier caused by their failure to take black English into account, "unless they are 
helped by the defendants to recognize the existence of the language system and to use that 
knowledge as a way of helping the children learn to read standard English." 473 F. Supp. at 
1383. This language indicates that failing to take black English "into account" means failing 
to recognize the nature of black English and the problems it may cause black-English-speaking 
children, as well as failing to use that knowledge in teaching them to read standard English. 
Second, the evidence from the teachers' testimony, which underlies the "taking into account" 
finding, supports this interpretation. The court's three conclusions are listed in note 41 supra. 
The first finding implies that the teachers knew the children spoke differently from other chil-
dren in the class, but did not realize or refused to recognize that these differences arose because 
the children spoke a systematic dialect. The court apparently assumed that the teachers there-
fore viewed the children's spoken deviations from standard English as simply a series of ran-
dom mistakes or errors, and did not recognize that the deviations were actually caused by the 
children's dialect background. See note 34 supra. Although there was no evidence that the 
teachers actually displayed insensitivity toward the children, or misjudged the children's ca-
pacity, the court was apparently willing to assume that such behavior would inevitably occur 
in the classroom if the teachers failed to recognize the systematic nature of black English, and 
its social importance to the children who spoke it. The second and third findings show that the 
teachers treated the plaintiffs just like other students who made many unexplained mistakes 
when speaking or reading aloud. In so doing, they failed to understand that the children's 
speech deviations from standard English partially stemmed from their use of a systematic 
home dialect. 
44. See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text. 
45. See notes 34-36 supra. 
46. The court found a language barrier at King School by finding first, as a general propo-
sition, that teachers' treatment of black English as inferior creates 'a language barrier, and 
second, that the teachers at King School treated black English as inferior. See note 50 i'!fra 
and accompanying text. It is significant that the first step was a finding of fact rather than law, 
see note 30 supra. Had the court taken the first step as a matter of law, then later black-
English-speaking plaintiffs, relying on King, could have established the existence of a lan-
guage barrier by proving only that their teachers treated black English as inferior. Under the 
case as it was actually decided, future plaintiffs who want the court to make the same two-step 
inference will have to introduce evidence on the first step: research findings and expert testi-
mony connecting "treatment as inferior'' with students' reading problems. 
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guage barrier had created any impediment to the plaintiffs' equal 
participation in King School's instructional program. The court ap-
parently took judicial notice that failure to learn to read is a signifi-
cant impediment to equal participation and focused on whether the 
language barrier impeded the children's reading progress.47 The 
court found that absences from class, learning disabilities, and emo-
tional impairment at least partially caused the children's reading 
problems, but it could not point to any specific evidence that the 
language barrier at King School interfered with the plaintiffs' read-
ing development.48 The court seems to have relied entirely on the 
research evidence to establish that the teachers' treatment of black 
English as inferior (by failing to take it into account) contributed to 
the children's reading problems.49 The court's holding that the King 
School teachers created a language barrier rests, therefore, on two 
inferences: first, on the inference from the research evidence that if 
teachers "treat black English as inferior" they will impede the read-
ing progress of black-English-speaking students; and second, on the 
inference from the teachers' testimony that they, in fact, treated 
black English as inferior. so 
Some caution is in order. The research evidence presented to the 
court only weakly supports even the limited proposition that teachers 
who treat black English as inferior can impede their students' read-
ing progress, much less that they will do so in most cases. Most of 
the researchers' conclusions as to the actual mechanisms by which 
this impediment could arise are based only on hypothesis or conjec-
ture.51 Though some of these theories are intuitively persua-
47. See 473 F. Supp. at 1377. 
48. 473 F. Supp. at 1380. 
49. 473 F. Supp. at 1380-81. 
50. 473 F. Supp. at 1377, 1378, 1382. 
The court apparently concluded that the research evidence could establish only that teach-
ers who "treat black English as inferior'' can cause some reading problems for their students 
who speak it. This explains the strange equivocation in the court's actual holding: ''The evi-
dence supports'll finding that [the language barrier] may be one of the causes of the children's 
reading problems." 473 F. Supp. at 1382 (emphasis added). But if the plaintiffs did not prove 
that the language barrier was one of the causes, then the court could not properly have found 
liability. The fact that the language barrier impeded the children's reading progress (and 
therefore their equal participation in the school's instructional program, 473 F. Supp. at 1377) 
was an essential element of the plaintiffs' case under section 1703([). See 473 F. Supp. at 1374. 
Consequently, this language in the opinion must mean not only that the language barrier may 
have been one of the causes, but also that it was sufficiently likely to have been one of the 
causes to satisfy the plaintiffs' burden of proof. In other words, the court must have found that 
the research evidence established to a degree sufficient to satisfy the plaintiffs' burden of proof 
that if teachers treat black English as inferior, they will impede the reading progress of their 
black-English-speaking students. 
51. One researcher did claim to demonstrate a statistically significant correlation between 
teacher attitudes toward black English and students' reading achievement. See,. A. Covington, 
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sive,52 others depend on controversial and possibly discredited find-
ings by other researchers. 53 Later courts should not depend on the 
validity of the research presented in King without subjecting it to 
independent scrutiny. 
A possible explanation for the King court's willingness to go so 
far on so little is that the defendant school board presented no expert 
witnesses or research evidence of its own. Although the plaintiffs' 
evidence and testimony were subject to cross-examination,54 the re-
search on which the court relied has not been fully tested by the 
adversary process. This further suggests that later courts should not 
A Study of Teachers' Attitudes Toward Black English: Effects on Student Achievement 67 
(July 21, 1972) (doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh) (on file with the Michigan Law 
Review), cited by the court as A. Covington, Teachers' Attitudes Toward Black English: Jfffects 
on Student Achievement' in EBONICS: THE TRUE LANGUAGE OF BLACK FOLKS (R. Williams 
ed. 1975). The author of the study admits, however, that the "school in which the research was 
conducted was atypical" and suggests that more studies are needed. Other researchers have 
also claimed to demonstrate that teachers' expectations for students may determine students' 
performance. See, e.g., R. ROSENTHAL & L. JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM 
(1968); Rosenthal & Jacobson, Se!f-Fu!filling Prophecies in the Classroom: Teachers' Expecta• 
tions as Unintended .Determinants of Pupils' Intellectual Competence, reprinted in SoclAL 
CLASS, RACE, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT (M. Deutsch, I. Katz, & A. Jensen eds. 
1968); Rosenthal & Jacobson, Teacher Expectations for the .Disadvantaged, SCIENTIFIC AM., 
Apr. 1968, at 19. If these studies are correct, and if the evidence presented at trial established 
that teachers who believe black English is inferior also believe children who speak it are 
"dumb" or "inferior," then the "expectation" or "self-fulfilling prophecy" theory could pro-
vide the causal nexus between teacher attitudes toward black English and student reading 
failure. Furthermore, if unconscious teacher attitudes alone are sufficient to create student 
reading failure, then it would seem that teachers' overt behavior toward black English (treating 
it as inferior) would a fortiori create reading problems for students. 
This hypothesis is doubtful, however, because of the questionable validity of the Rosenthal 
and Jacobson studies. Many researchers have criticized the studies; others have attempted to 
replicate the Rosenthal and Jacobson findings and have failed. See, e.g., J. ELASHOFF & R. 
SNOW, PYGMALION RECONSIDERED: A CASE STUDY IN STATISTICAL INFERENCE (1971) (criti• 
cizing Rosenthal and Jacobson on statistical and experimental design grounds); Alpert, 
Teacher Behavior Across Ability Groups: A Consideration of the Mediation of Pygmalion Fj'-
fects, 66 J. EDUC. PsYCH. 348 (1974) (finding that teachers treated top and bottom reading 
groups the same, indicating that teacher behavior may not be adversely affected by teacher 
expectation); Claiborn, Expectancy Effects in the Classroom: A Failure To Replicate, 60 J. 
EDuc. PSYCH. 377 (1969); Dusek & O'Connell, Teacher Expectancy Effects on the Achievement 
Test Peiformance of Elementary School Children, 65 J. EDUC. PSYCH. 371 (1973) (finding no 
teacher bias effect). 
Several of the researchers cited by the King court appear to rely on the Rosenthal and 
Jacobson studies, or the general theory of "expectation" effects to establish some causal link 
between teacher attitudes and behavior and student failure. See Labov, The Logic of Nonstan-
dard English, supra note 4, at 179 (citing Rosenthal and Jacobson's work); R. BURLING, supra 
note 4, at 95 (discussing teacher expectations and implying that they may have an effect on 
student performance). 
52. Some kinds of teacher behavior have obvious negative effects on student performance. 
See, e.g., the example cited in note 36 supra. On the other hand, this behavior may simply 
indicate that the teacher is insensitive to student needs generally, and not that the teacher has a 
problem related specifically to his or her view of children's dialect. Section 1703([) may there-
fore not be implicated. 
53. See note 51 supra. 
54. 473 F. Supp. at 1375. 
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interpret King as a wholehearted validation of the research findings 
discussed in the opinion. The court simply found that the evidence 
was adequate, when uncontradicted by other research findings or 
expert testimony, to establish the plaintiffs' propositions. 
III. APPROPRIATE ACTION 
Once Judge Joiner decided that a language barrier existed at 
King School, and that it impeded the plaintiffs' equal participation 
in the school's instructional programs, he proceeded to the next stat-
utory inquiry: had the defendants failed to take appropriate action 
to overcome that language barrier? According to the court, "appro-
priate action" under section 1703([) is action that is "rational and 
logical in light of the situation confronting [school authorities] and 
the knowledge reasonably available to them."55 This interpretation 
imposes a duty on school authorities to take reasonable steps toward 
overcoming language barriers, but does not require authorities to to-
tally eliminate existing language barriers in order to comply with the 
statute. 56 The court found that the Ann Arbor School Board had 
failed to take appropriate action to overcome the language barrier at 
55. 473 F. Supp. at 1382. 
56. One commentator has suggested that the King court's "appropriate action" interpreta-
tion reflects the holdings of prior cases that programs to remedy language barriers must be 
"effective." See Comment, Judicial Recognition ef Black English as a Language Barrier Under 
the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1445, 1461-64 (1980). Presumably, 
this means that school districts must completely eliminate the language barriers encountered 
by their students in order to avoid continuing liability under section l 703(f). 
The cases on which the Iowa Comment relies were decided under title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), which provides: "No person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance." In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974), the 
Supreme Court held that regulations promulgated by HEW to enforce title VI guarantees, 
including the National Origins Memorandum, see note 20 supra, required school districts re-
ceiving federal funds to take affirmative steps to overcome language deficiencies that excluded 
national-origin minority children from effective participation in instructional programs. In 
1975 HEW promulgated guidelines, known as the "Lau Guidelines," prescribing the form of 
bilingual education programs. See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS OF H.E.W., TASK FORCE FIND-
INGS SPECIFYING REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR ELIMINATING PAST EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES 
RULED UNLAWFUL UNDER LAU v. NICHOLS (1975). Secretary Richardson's testimony before 
the House and Senate Committees indicates that section 1703(f) was intended, among other 
things, to clarify and enact into law the duties imposed by the National Origins Memorandum. 
See House Hearings, supra note 12, at 28. Therefore, title VI bilingual education cases are not 
inapposite to section 1703(f) analysis, as a general proposition. But these cases, including the 
two on which the Iowa Comment relies, Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th 
Cir. 1974), and Rios v. Read, 73 F.R.D. 589 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (preliminary order), 480 F. Supp. 
14 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (subsequent disposition on the merits) (not cited by author), do not estab-
lish the proposition that courts will reject remedial plans if they are not "effective." Rather, 
they simply indicate that if a school's plan violates established HEW guidelines, or applicable 
statutory provisions, it will be deemed unacceptable. Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 
at 1153-54; Rios v. Read, 73 F.R.D. at 595-96, 480 F. Supp. at 21-24. See also Cintron v. 
Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 63 & n.11 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (bilingual 
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King School57 because (1) the School Board should have been aware 
of the information contained in the research evidence and expert tes-
timony received by the court, and (2) there was no evidence that the 
Board had taken any action in response to this knowledge.58 The 
court held that the Board's failure to act was not rational and, there-
fore, not appropriate under section 1703(f).59 
Although neither the case law60 nor the legislative history of sec-
tion 1703(f)61 offer much insight into the propriety of the King 
court's interpretation of section l 703(f)'s "appropriate action" re-
quirement, logic and the statutory language support the court's inter-
pretation. The statute proscribes "the failure by an educational 
agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barri-
ers .... "62 Had Congress intended to hold educational agencies 
strictly liable for failure to eliminate language barriers, it would not 
have limited the duty of educational agencies under the statute by 
including the "appropriate action" language. Instead, it would have 
drafted section 1703(f) to prohibit "the failure by an educational 
education plan rejected because it violated both the Lau Guidelines and section 1703(a), and 
therefore was not "appropriate" under section 1703(f)). 
Because these cases all involved bilingual education programs, for which there are estab• 
lished guidelines, they do not provide an informative background against which to view the 
King holding. The King case did not involve a language barrier arising from comprehension 
problems, and no bilingual education program was requested by the plaintiffs or ordered by 
the court. The propriety of the court's "appropriate action" interpretation is thus best mea• 
sured not against cases addressing different problems, but against the language and legislative 
history of section 1703(f). Upon examination, both lend support to the King court's determi• 
nation that section l 703(f) only requires school districts to take reasonable steps to overcome 
language barriers such as the one present at King School. See text at notes 60-64 i'!fra. 
57. 473 F. Supp. at 1382. 
58. 473 F. Supp. at 1382-83. The evidence did show that the teachers had given the plain-
tiff students "an exceptional amount of special assistance in connection with their efforts to 
help them read." 473 F. Supp. at 1379. Nevertheless, the court apparently found that the 
teachers created a language barrier by providing this assistance without taking into account the 
children's black English dialect. 473 F. Supp. at 1382. See note 43 supra and accompanying 
text. 
59. 473 F. Supp. at 1383. 
60. All section 1703(f) cases prior to the King case involved barriers arising from foreign 
language differences and assumed that appropriate action required bilingual education,pro-
grams, without discussing the intended meaning of "appropriate action" under the statute. 
See, e.g., Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 
1022 (9th Cir. 1978); Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 
(1975); Deerfield Hutterian Assn. v. Ipswich Bd. of Educ., 444 F. Supp. 159 (D.S.D. 1978); 
Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
61. Secretary Richardson did not explicitly mention the parameters of "appropriate ac• 
tions" under section 1703(f) in his testimony, although he did suggest that the section would 
provide impetus for bilingual education programs. See Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 69. 
President Nixon's message did not discuss appropriate action, nor did the floor debate in the 
House of Representatives. 
62. 20 u.s.c. § 1703(f) (1976). 
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agency to overcome language barriers .... "63 The appropriate ac-
tion limitation in the statute therefore implies just the sort of reason-
ableness standard applied in King. 
Such a standard seems logical because language barriers that 
arise from dialect differences stem largely from cultural and socio-
economic inequality and isolation. 64 It is unlikely that such barriers 
can be completely eliminated until the underlying inequality and 
isolation are eradicated, and this eradication is beyond the unilateral 
power of the schools. If the "appropriate action" language of section 
1703(f) were interpreted to require educational agencies to com-
pletely eliminate language barriers to avoid liability, then even agen-
cies that adopt the most far-sighted programs would likely remain 
perpetual captives of the statute. Both the statutory language and 
the inherent difficulty of completely eliminating language barriers 
created by dialect differences therefore support the King court's in-
terpretation of section l 703(f)'s appropriate action requirement. 
IV. DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE OR DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT? 
Finally, the court had to determine whether the defendant's fail-
ure to take appropriate action to overcome the language barriers at 
King School was "on account of race."65 To decide this, Judge 
Joiner first had to resolve whether section l 703(f) condemns only 
purposeful failures to take appropriate action or whether it also con-
demns failures that have a racially discriminatory effect. The court 
concluded that section 1703(f) only requires plaintiffs to prove a ra-
cially discriminatory effect and does not require plaintiffs to meet the 
more difficult burden of proving a racially discriminatory purpose. 66 
Because the plaintiffs in King were all black children who were ex-
63. For the full actual text of section 1703(f), see note 2 supra. 
64. Stereotypes and attitudes concernlng the cognitive inadequacy or structural unsophisti-
cation of nonstandard dialects (and the level of intelligence or aptitude of their speakers) arise 
at least in part from cultural and socioeconomic differences between nonstandard and main-
stream speakers. See B. ARTHUR, supra note 4, at 85-86; R. BURLING, supra note 4, at 104; J. 
FALK, supra note 4, at 289, 303. While in-service programs such as the one adopted at King 
School, see notes 93-97 iefra and accompanying text, will produce more informed teachers, the 
attitudes and stereotypes described above are unlikely to disappear entirely until the social and 
economic divisions underlying them are eliminated. 
65. The question is discussed last in order to mirror the court's analytical framework. See 
Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 463 F. 
Supp. 1027, 1030-31 (E.D. Mich. 1978). This opinion, not the later opinion following the trial, 
Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Ann Arbor School Dist. Bd., 473 F. 
Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979), actually contains the court's interpretation of section 1703(f)'s 
"on account of race" language. See 463 F. Supp. at 1031-32. 
66. Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 463 
F. Supp. 1027, 1031-32 (E.D. Mich. 1978). 
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periencing reading difficulties, the court held that the Ann Arbor 
School District Board's failure to take appropriate action had a ra-
cially discriminatory effect and, therefore, was "on account of 
race."67 
The court determined that section l 703(f) embodies an "effect" 
standard by examining prior section l 703(f) cases, analogous stat-
utes, and the statute's legislative history.68 Prior cases provided little 
guidance to the court since they did not discuss whether section 
1703(f) requires purposeful racial discrimination.69 The court next 
turned to title VI7° and title VII71 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,72 
reasoning that section 1703(f) is "[s]imilar in purpose and lan-
guage."73 The court ruled that since both of these statutes incorpo-
rate an "effect" standard,74 section 1703(f) must also do so.75 To 
bolster its analogy between section 1703(f) and title VI, the court 
relied on HEW Secretary Richardson's statement before the House 
Committee on Education and Labor, that section 1703(f) was "es-
sentially declaratory of what ... [had been] previously construed to 
67. Martin Lµther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Ann Arbor School Dist. 
Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371, 1382 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 
68. Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 463 
F. Supp. 1027, 1031-32 (E.D. Mich. 1978). 
69. 463 F. Supp. at 1031-32. See Gaudalupe Organization Inc. v. Tempe Elementary 
School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978); Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist. 
No. 51,568 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1977); Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975); Deerfield Hutterian Assn. v. Ipswich Bd. of Educ., 444 F. Supp. 
159 (D.S.D. 1978); Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57 (E.D.N.Y. 
1978). 
On remand, the district court in Otero held that section 1703 prohibits only purposeful 
discrimination. 470 F. Supp. 326,331 (D. Colo. 1979) (decided after King). The court did not 
explicitly state which provision of section 1703 it was considering, but because the plaintiffs 
were alleging discriminatory hiring practices, the court must have been referring to section 
1703(d), which prohibits such practices. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(d) (1976). The court seems to have 
reached its conclusion that section 1703 as a whole prohibits only purposeful discrimination by 
assuming that§ 1703 is coterminous with title VI, which, according to the court, prohibits only 
purposeful discrimination. See 470 F. Supp. at 330-31. The misconceptions underlying this 
argument are discussed elsewhere in this Note. See notes 88-91 i'!f"ra and accompanying text. 
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). 
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). 
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1976). 
73. 463 F. Supp. at 1031-32. 
74. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court held that title 
VII embraces an effect standard. 401 U.S. at 430-32. The Court later held in Lau v. Nichols, 
414 U.S. 563 (1974), that HEW regulations promulgated under title VI incorporated a discrim-
inatory effect standard. 414 U.S. at 568-69. But, in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978), a plurality of justices held that title VI is coterminous with the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment, and, therefore, prohibits only purposeful discrimina-
tion. See 438 U.S. at 284-87. 
75. 463 F. Supp. at 1032. 
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be a title VI requirement."76 
Although the Supreme Court apparently interpreted title VI to 
contain an effect standard in Lau v. Nicho!s,11 Judge Joiner's "simi-
lar purpose and language" argument is weakened by the Supreme 
Court's later ruling in Regents ef the University ef Ca!!fornia v. 
Bakke .18 In Bakke, a plurality of justices held that title VI pros-
cribes only discrimination that would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the fourteenth amendment.79 Because the Court had ear-
lier held in Washington v. Davis80 that the fourteenth amendment 
prohibits only purposeful discrimination,81 the Bakke decision sug-
gests that title VI incorporates a "purpose or motive" standard. 82 If 
so, title VI and title VII embrace different standards, and the court's 
argument that statutes "similar in purpose and language" embrace 
similar standards is untenable. Furthermore, if title VI embraces a 
discriminatory purpose standard, then the court's reference to Secre-
tary Richardson's testimony to strengthen its analogy between sec-
tion 1703(f) and title VI actually undermines the court's holding. 
Because the King court was apparently unaware of the adverse 
impact of Bakke on its rationale, 83 its attempt to determine the 
meaning of section 1703([) by analogizing it to other similar statutes 
leaves the opinion vulnerable to attack. This is particularly unfortu-
nate because a further analysis of the statutory language and legisla-
tive history reveals that the court's interpretation of section 1703([) 
was ultimately correct. 
First, the statutory language suggests that section 1703([) prohib-
its failures to take appropriate action that have a racially discrimi-
natory effect. Section 1703 begins with the following prefatory 
language: 
No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on 
account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by . . . . 84 
16. See House Hearings, supra note 12, at 28. The King court paraphrased Secretary Rich-
ardson's testimony. See 463 F. Supp. at 1032. 
77. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). See note 74 supra. 
78. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
79. 438 U.S. at 284-87. 
80. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
81. 426 U.S. at 238-48. 
82. Justice Brennan's Bakke opinion expressed doubt about the continuing validity of the 
Court's determination in Lau that title VI incorporated an effect standard. 438 U.S. at 352 
(Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). 
83. The King court discusses Lau v. Nichols to support its conclusion that title VI em-
braces an effect standard but fails to mention Bakke. See Martin Luther King Junior Elemen-
tary School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 463 F. Supp. 1027, 1032 (1978). 
84. 20 u.s.c. § 1703 (1976). 
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Six subsections follow this preface, 85 some of which explicitly con-
demn only purposeful violations of section 1703. For example, sec-
tion 1703(a) forbids only deliberate segregation of schools by an 
educational agency,86 and section 1703(e) condemns transfers of stu-
dents from one school to another only if the purpose and effect of 
such transfers is to increase segregation. 87 If Congress had intended 
the prefatory language to embody a discriminatory purpose standard 
applicable to all of the statute's subsections, it seems unlikely that it 
would specify in particular subsections that only purposeful viola-
tions are forbidden. Apparently, Congress was careful to specify its 
desire to prohibit only purposeful discrimination when it meant to 
do so, yet it omitted this requirement from section 1703(f). 
The legislative history also suggests that Congress intended sec-
tion 1703(f) to embrace an "effect" standard. It reveals that the cen-
tral focus of section 1703(f) was to provide additional impetus to the 
HEW National Origins Memorandum promulgated under title Vl,88 
which essentially required schools receiving federal funds to take af-
firmative steps to assure equal educational opportunity for non-Eng-
lish-speaking minority children.89 The National Origins 
Memorandum guidelines embraced a discriminatory effects stan-
dard.90 According to Secretary Richardson, one of section 1703(f)'s 
purposes was to strengthen these guidelines by granting non-Eng-
lish-speaking students an affirmative right to an adequate bilingual 
education.91 To hold that section 1703(f) requires a showing of dis-
criminatory purpose would make section 1703(f) weaker than the 
HEW guideline it was intended to fortify. 
Thus, the language and legislative history of the statute support 
Judge Joiner's conclusion that section 1703(f) requires only a show-
ing of racially discriminatory effect. Since the language barrier at 
King School adversely affected only black students, the court prop-
erly found that the School Board's failure to take appropriate action 
was on account of race, and therefore violated section l 703(f). 
85. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a)-(f) (1976). 
86. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (1976). 
81. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(e) (1976). 
88. 35 Fed. Reg. ll,595 (1970). See Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 69. 
89. See 35 Fed. Reg. ll,595 (1970). 
90. The National Origins Memorandum, 35 Fed. Reg. ll,595 (1970), effectively incorpo-
rates the discriminatory effect standard contained in HEW's title VI implementing regulations. 
See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1979); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 567-69 (1974), 
91. See Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 69. 
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The popular press has generally misunderstood the King decision 
as a case in which the court ordered the Ann Arbor School District 
to encourage the use of black English or to provide instruction in 
black English.92 This mistaken notion of the King remedy has ob-
scured the true significance of the case. In fact, the actual remedy in 
King seems modest and reasonable given the language barrier un-
covered in the litigation. Because the language barrier arose from 
the District's failure to provide its teachers with necessary informa-
tion about black English, the court ordered the "defendant Board to 
take steps to help its teachers to recognize the home language of the 
students and to use that knowledge in their attempts to teach reading 
skills in standard English."93 The court declined to impose a particu-
lar plan upon the defendants, recognizing its lack of expertise as an 
educational policymaker.94 Instead, it deferred to the School Board 
to formulate a program, requiring only that the program be reason-
able and rational in light of existing knowledge, thereby satisfying 
section 1703(f)'s appropriate action requirement.95 Responding to 
the court's order, the School Board ,submitted a plan providing for 
an in-service program to instruct teachers "in general language and 
dialect concepts including the contrasting feature of black and stan-
dard English, the identification of black-English speakers, the ac-
commodation of code-switching needs in black-English speakers, 
and the use of knowledge of dialect differences to help individual 
students read standard English."96 The court accepted this proposed 
plan, with minor modifi.cations.97 
92. See, e.g., Beck, Should Black English Be Taught as a Language?, Chicago Tribune, 
July 16, 1979, § 3, at 2, col. 6. For an example ofpublicmisperception of the King case created 
by the press, see Views of Our Readers, 66 A.B.A.J. 1494 (1980). These letters were written in 
response to Middleton, Educators .D[ffer: Black English Goes to Court, 66 A.B.A.J. 1062 (1980) 
(an article preceded by a photograph of black children captioned "Will black English help 
black children learn to read?"). 
93. Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Ann Arbor School Dist. 
Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371, 1383 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 
Although the Equal Educational Of>portunities Act does not provide specific remedies for 
violations of section 1703(f), section 1706 does authorize the courts to fashion "appropriate" 
relief. 20 U.S.C. § 1706 (1976). 
94. 473 F. Supp. at 1385. The court apparently realized that the alternative to deferring to 
the school board's judgment as to the particular plan implemented would have been to choose 
between the suggestions of the various experts who testified, or to select from other similar 
proposals. The experts, however, proposed a wide variety of solutions. See 473 F. Supp. at 
1377-78. In effect, the court would have been forced to decide which of the experts, all testify-
ing for the plaintiffs, had proposed the most "appropriate" plan. 
95. 473 F. Supp. at 1383, 1385. 
96. 473 F. Supp. at 1385. 
97. The court ordered the defendants not only to evaluate the in-service training program, 
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The true significance of the King decision lies not in the remedy 
the court ordered, but in the nature of the language barrier it recog-
nized and the burden of proof of discrimination it established for 
plaintiffs alleging a violation of section l 703(f) of the Equal Educa-
tional Opportunities Act. Unlike bilingual education cases, the King 
decision did not involve a comprehension barrier that arose from 
foreign language differences; rather, it involved a language barrier 
that arose because the King School teachers, in the court's judgment, 
did not have adequate information about black English to properly 
teach black-English-speaking students. Because such information 
was readily available, the court held that the Ann Arbor School Dis-
trict's failure to provide it to teachers was irrational, and therefore 
not "appropriate" under section l 703(f). The court ordered a rem-
edy for this failure to take appropriate action solely on a finding of 
discriminatory effect. 
The misinformed media reaction to the King decision has given 
the opinion a reputation of radicalism and unreasonableness that is 
both undeserved and unfortunate. Rather than succumb to these 
distortions, readers should recognize the decision for what it is - a 
proper application of section 1703(f) to assure that black-English-
speaking children enjoy equal educational opportunity. 
but also to attempt to evaluate tbe effect oftbe plan on the plaintiffs' reading progress. 473 F. 
Supp. at 1390. 
In August 1980, tbe Ann Arbor School District released the evaluation of its in-service plan 
conducted over the 1979-1980 school year. See ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, FINAL EVALU· 
ATION: KING ELEMENTARY SCHOOL VERNACULAR BLACK ENGLISH INSERVICE PROGRAM 
(Aug. 20, 1980) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (hereinafter cited as FINAL EVALUA· 
TION]. The in-service program was successful in transmitting tbe intended information to the 
teachers. See FINAL EVALUATION, Section III, at 17. While the District did find that the 
children's attendance improved, see FINAL EVALUATION, Section IV, at 3, it was unable to 
demonstrate empirically tbat the plan had any effect on tbe reading achievement of the plain-
tiff children. See FINAL EVALUATION, Section IV, at 3(a). This inability is unsurprising, be-
cause as both the Final Evaluation and tbe court's opinion note, many other factors contributed 
to the plaintiffs' reading difficulties. See id.; 473 F. Supp. at 1380. 
